tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5983563776019477979.post6091878216016073053..comments2023-05-02T19:47:53.788-07:00Comments on Tehom: Are the stances really in that order?Tehomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14836581076251384864noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5983563776019477979.post-58628058605046376542011-09-06T13:44:58.812-07:002011-09-06T13:44:58.812-07:00Hm. Yes, the obligational stance presumes the inte...Hm. Yes, the obligational stance presumes the intentional stance. The design stance presumes the physical stance.<br /><br />Does the intentional stance presume the physical stance? First I thought maybe not. Then (poaching on Cartesian territory) I thought maybe if we had minds but not bodies, our minds would effectively *be* the "physical world". But then I realized, that would be a non-reductionist "physical world", and without reductionism the design stance would be, if not meaningless, at least pointless. Which is when I decided reductionism is taken as given by this whole structure. Of course Dennett would. And Dennett, starting from reductionism, would consider evolution (hence, design stance) necessary to support the intentional stance.<br /><br />The question is, then, whether one wants a topology that requires reductionism (in which case, linearity is fine), or one that is philosophically robust enough to work for non-reductionists.John Shutthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00041398073010099077noreply@blogger.com